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REVOKING THE “GET OUT OF JAIL FREE
CARD”: HOW MAVRIX PHOTOGRAPHS, LLC V.
LIVEJOURNAL, INC. COULD REVOLUTIONIZE
USER-GENERATED SAFE HARBOR PROTECTION
UNDER § 512(C) OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT
Caitlin Oswald*
I. INTRODUCTION
On seven different occasions between 2010 to 2014, the popular
celebrity gossip community Oh No They Didn’t! (“ONTD”) allowed
more than twenty watermarked photographs belonging to celebrity
photograph agency, Mavrix Photographs (“Mavrix”), to appear on its
website without Mavrix’s permission.1 These photographs were
initially submitted to ONTD by the community’s online users, but
were subject to review and approval by ONTD community
moderators2 before publicly appearing on the website.3 As a result of
ONTD’s continued posting of Mavrix’s copyrighted photographs,
Mavrix filed a copyright suit against ONTD’s parent social media
platform, LiveJournal Inc. (“LiveJournal”), alleging copyright

* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
Thank you to Professor Justin Hughes for solidifying my interest in intellectual property law and
for your constant guidance as I researched and wrote this Comment. I dedicate this Comment to
my parents and sister, for their steadfast love, support, and encouragement throughout my
educational career.
1. Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., 873 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2017).
2. See id. at 1050. Nearly all major internet service providers that incorporate user-generated
content into their business models are policed by content moderators. Moderators are frequently
employed by websites to review users’ posts to ensure that they follow the internet service
provider’s terms of service before being approved and publicly uploaded onto the website.
3. Id. at 1049.
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infringement4 for the more than twenty copyrighted photographs that
the moderators allowed onto the ONTD website.5
When the case came before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, a considerable question regarding the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act’s (“DMCA”) section 512(c) safe harbor
provision arose.6 The court considered whether the acts of the ONTD
moderators could be attributed to LiveJournal under the common law
of agency. The court ruled that if an agency relationship existed
between LiveJournal and the moderators, LiveJournal would be
denied the section 512(c) safe harbor defense for copyright
infringement and would likely be found liable.7
The conclusion reached by the majority of the court is significant
to internet service providers (“ISPs”) and copyright owners in the
Ninth Circuit. Under current copyright law, copyright owners are
responsible for detecting and reporting to an ISP that infringing
content was found on its website. This allocation of responsibility has
caused rampant online copyright infringement to occur undetected.
Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc.8 presented the Ninth
4. 17
U.S.C.
§ 106
(2017);
Definitions,
COPYRIGHT.GOV,
https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-definitions.html (Copyright infringement occurs “when a
copyrighted work is reproduced, distributed, performed, publicly displayed, or made into a
derivative work without the permission of the copyright owner.”).
5. Mavrix, 873 F.3d at 1051.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2017)
(“(c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users.
(1) In general. A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided
in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by
reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider—
(A)
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material
on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or
disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in
a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing
or to be the subject of infringing activity.”).
7. Mavrix, 873 F.3d at 1048, 1054 (“We therefore have little difficulty holding that common
law agency principles apply to the analysis of whether a service provider like LiveJournal is liable
for the acts of the ONTD moderators. In light of the summary judgment record, we conclude that
there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the moderators are LiveJournal’s agents.”).
8. 873 F.3d 1045.
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Circuit with an opportunity to further clarify the meaning and scope
of the DMCA section 512(c) safe harbor immunity for ISPs who use
online moderators. But technological companies warn that the court’s
ruling could dissuade ISPs from using moderators altogether if the use
would cause technological companies to lose the section 512(c) safe
harbor immunity, and thus, be liable for copyright infringement.
Part II of this Comment discusses the factual background of the
case and relevant case law, while Part III provides a summary of the
case. Part IV gives an account of the court’s reasoning in concluding
that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
LiveJournal’s moderators were agents of the ISP, thereby placing the
company outside the safe harbor protection. Part V analyzes the
court’s reasoning in the context of past and recent court decisions
regarding the section 512(c) safe harbor provision and discusses the
potential legal significance the case’s outcome could have in the Ninth
Circuit. Part VI concludes that Mavrix’s shift away from granting ISPs
total immunity under the DMCA safe harbor is a necessary step in the
modern digital age and will not cripple ISPs’ incentives to moderate
user-generated content.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Safe Harbors
Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act9 in 1998
when the internet was in its inception.10 Congress’s intent in passing
the DMCA was to balance the protected rights of copyright holders
with innovative technologies created by ISPs as the internet continued
to develop.11 Congress consequently created four “safe harbor”
statutes under 17 U.S.C. § 512 that protect ISPs from the potential
liability arising from claims of copyright infringement.12

9. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2017).
10. Liliana Chang, The Red Flag Test for Apparent Knowledge Under the DMCA § 512(c)
Safe Harbor, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 198 (2010); Donald P. Harris, Time to Reboot?:
DMCA 2.0, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 801, 802, 805–06 (2015).
11. H.R. Rep. No. 105-551 at 21 (1998).
12. Viacom Int’l v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2nd Cir. 2012) (“Congress elected to . . .
create a series of ‘safe harbors[]’ for certain common activities of service providers.”).
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B. Safe Harbor Threshold Requirements
To qualify for safe harbor protection, an ISP must be a service
provider according to the statutory definition in section 512(k) and
must meet section 512(i)’s “conditions of eligibility.”13
Once the threshold requirements are fulfilled, an ISP must
additionally fall within one of the four enumerated safe harbor
requirements to qualify for immunity under the safe harbor.14
Section 512 provides protection to ISPs in the following situations:
“(a) transitory digital network communications; (b) system caching;
(c) information residing on systems or networks at the direction of the
users; and (d) information location tools.”15 The Mavrix case
specifically focuses on section 512(c). When infringing material on a
website or server is hosted by an ISP, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) limits
liability for copyright infringement that occurs “by reason of the
storage at the direction of a user.”16
C. Historical Framework: UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital
Partners LLC
The Ninth Circuit’s 2013 opinion in UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Shelter Capital Partners LLC17 held that Veoh satisfied the
section 512(c)(1) threshold. The court ruled that safe harbor
protections applied because the infringing material residing on Veoh’s
system was “stor[ed] at the direction of a user of material.”18 Users
uploaded infringing videos to Veoh’s website, and Veoh would
automatically breakdown the file, assign permalinks to uniquely
identify each video, and then make the videos available to users on the
website.19
UMG argued for a narrow interpretation of the statutory phrase
“storage at the direction of the user” because the facilitation of public
access to the material went beyond mere storage.20 UMG asserted that
Veoh was not simply storing the material with the ISP because Veoh
13. See Chang, supra note 9, at 199.
14. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir.
2013); see Chang, supra note 9, at 199.
15. Jennifer Bretan, Harboring Doubts About the Efficacy of § 512 Immunity Under the
DMCA, 18 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 43, 48 (2003).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
17. 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013).
18. Id. at 1020.
19. Id. at 1011–12.
20. Id. at 1016.
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actively created flash files, downloaded files, and shared infringing
material.21 The court disagreed and explained that Congress intended
a broader reading of the phrase “at the direction of the user” than
UMG’s interpretation.22 The language of section 512 (c) extends
beyond mere electronic storage and applies to “access-facilitating”
processes that automatically occur when a website’s user uploads
material to an ISP.23 The court reasoned that the “by reason of”
language presumes that ISPs will provide public access to user stored
material.24 Hence, a ruling disqualifying Veoh from the safe harbor
protections for providing public access to the stored material would
run contrary to the legislative intent.25
The court noted that Veoh was permitted to modify usersubmitted material to assist storage and access to the public under the
broader rationale of section 512(c).26 The court also explained that if
Congress meant to disallow this action, it would have expressly
included a limitation as it did regarding the narrow definition of
“service provider.”27
The statute also provides that a user is unlikely to infringe solely
by storing material on a server that no one can access. 28 This idea
extends to activities that go beyond “merely storing material.”29 Veoh
employees, however, did not actively preview or supervise file
uploading, “nor did [Veoh] preview or select the files before the
upload [was] complete” and the material was made public.30 Rather,
Veoh made files accessible to the public by using an “automated
process” that was entirely at the discretion of Veoh users. 31
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LiveJournal is a social media platform that allows users to create
personalized “thematic communities” where they can upload content
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1016–17.
25. Id. at 1017–18.
26. Id. at 1019–20.
27. Id. at 1020.
28. Id. at 1019.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1020; see Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1138 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
31. UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1020.
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and comment on posts related to a theme.32 ONTD is a popular,
human-moderated LiveJournal community thematically focused on
celebrity news.33 Users submit content that automatically uploads to
LiveJournal’s servers and is placed in a queue.34 Moderators then
review the user-generated submissions for breaking celebrity news,
copyright infringement, pornography, and harassment.35 Ultimately,
moderators decide to either reject or publicly post the submissions on
ONTD.36
During the relevant time period, unpaid ONTD moderators
quickly reviewed user-generated content for compliance with
LiveJournal rules, and approved content that conformed to those
specifications on a massive scale. 37 The moderators were led by the
“primary leader,” Brian Delzer.38 As primary leader, Delzer was a fulltime paid employee of LiveJournal.39 He performed moderator work,
instructed ONTD moderators which “content they should approve[,]
and select[ed] and removed moderators on the basis of their
performance.”40
Mavrix is a photography company that takes paparazzi
photographs of celebrities in tropical locations and sells the
photographs to celebrity magazines.41 Mavrix claimed that ONTD’s
posts of its copyrighted photographs prevented Mavrix from profiting
from the sale of these photographs to magazines because its business
model relied on breaking celebrity news.42
From 2010 to 2014, ONTD posted Mavrix’s photographs
containing “generic watermarks,” or the mark “Mavrixonline.com,” in
seven posts.43 During that time, LiveJournal claimed that it did not
possess a technological method to determine who approved the seven

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., 873 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1050.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1050–51.
Id. at 1051.
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posts on ONTD.44 Brian Delzer, the primary leader, also claimed that
he did not approve the posts.45
Mavrix did not send a notice-and-takedown letter and, instead,
brought an action for damages and injunctive relief against
LiveJournal for copyright infringement in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California.46 Mavrix alleged that LiveJournal
did not qualify for the section 512(c) safe harbor provision.47 Mavrix
argued that the “at the direction of the user” language of section 512(c)
limited the safe harbor immunity to situations in which an ISP’s user
stores infringing content on “a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider.”48 In particular, Mavrix argued
that third-party users did not upload the posts to LiveJournal’s
communities.49 Rather, Mavrix claimed the moderators acted as agents
of LiveJournal by pre-screening the stored content and posting the
infringing material on ONTD.50 LiveJournal, on the other hand,
asserted that it only provided the online platform to enable users to
create blog communities, and was unaware of the alleged infringing
material posts.51
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
LiveJournal, holding that the DMCA’s section 512(c) safe harbor
provision protected LiveJournal from liability for copyright
infringement.52 Specifically, the court held that Mavrix’s photographs
were publicly posted on ONTD “at the direction of the user” despite
the moderators’ actions of screening and uploading every ONTD
post.53 Thus, the common law of agency did not apply.54
Mavrix appealed.55

44. Id. at 1050.
45. Id. at 1051.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 1053 (“Mavrix, relying on the common law of agency, argues that the moderators
are LiveJournal’s agents, making LiveJournal liable for the moderators’ acts. The district court
erred in rejecting this argument.”).
48. Mavrix Photographs LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., No. SACV 13-00517-CJC(JPRx), 2014
WL 6450094, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 19, 2014) (“[I]nfringing material has been emailed to the editor
of a newspaper and resides on the newspapers servers, but is never made available to the public.”).
49. See id. at *5 n.7.
50. See Mavrix Photographs, LLC, 873 F.3d at 1053.
51. Mavrix, 2014 WL 6450094, at *1.
52. Mavrix Photographs, LLC, 873 F.3d at 1051.
53. Id. at 1052.
54. Id. at 1049.
55. Id. at 1051.
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IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
On appeal, Mavrix applied the common law of agency to contend
that the ONTD moderators were LiveJournal’s agents. 56 Mavrix
asserted that LiveJournal was liable for the acts of its moderators and
should be precluded from the section 512(c) safe harbor immunity.57
LiveJournal countered and argued that the section 512(c) statute
protected the company from damages for copyright infringement
because the posts were stored “at the direction of a user.”58
The Mavrix court began its opinion by explaining the eligibility
for the section 512(c) safe harbor. The court ultimately held that there
was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether ONTD
moderators were agents of LiveJournal.59 Hence, the court found
LiveJournal should most likely not be protected under the
section 512(c) safe harbor provision.60 To reach this conclusion, the
court applied common law agency principles of actual and apparent
authority and examined the amount of control LiveJournal held over
its moderators.61
Under these principles, the court concluded that LiveJournal
maintained sufficient control over its moderators for an agency
relationship to exist.62 To illustrate its reasoning, the court applied the
Restatement (Third) of Agency to the facts of the case. 63 Overall, the
court found that “reasonable jurors could conclude that an agency
relationship existed” under the common law of agency. 64
The Ninth Circuit also declared that if an agency relationship is
found to exist, then the question of whether the ONTD content was

56. Id. at 1053.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1052.
59. Id. at 1054.
60. See id. at 1054, 1056 (“From the evidence currently in the record, reasonable jurors could
conclude that an agency relationship existed.”).
61. Id. at 1057.
62. Id. at 1055–56 (“LiveJournal maintains significant control over ONTD and its moderators.
Delzer gives the moderators substantive supervision and selects and removes moderators on the
basis of their performance, thus demonstrating control. . . . Further demonstrating LiveJournal’s
control over the moderators, the moderators’ screening criteria derive from rules ratified by
LiveJournal. . . . This evidence raises genuine issues of material fact regarding the level of control
LiveJournal exercised over the moderators. From the evidence currently in the record, reasonable
jurors could conclude that an agency relationship existed.”).
63. Id. at 1054–55; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (AM. LAW. INST. 2006).
64. Mavrix Photographs, LLC, 873 F.3d at 1056.
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posted “at the direction of the user” must be answered. 65 Shelter
Capital stated the content was either posted “at the direction” of the
moderators in their screening and posting role, or the moderators
played a passive “accessibility enhancing” role in posting the
content.66 According to the court, the crucial question was whether the
manual reviewing and posting by the moderators was considered
posting “at the direction of the user.”67
Having established that the district court erroneously failed to
apply the common law of agency, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment providing the defendant
immunity under the section 512(c) safe harbor.68 The case was
remanded to the district court to reassess LiveJournal’s threshold
eligibility for the section 512(c) safe harbor by: (1) “resolv[ing] the
factual dispute regarding the moderators’ status as LiveJournal’s
agents” and (2) “whether LiveJournal showed that Mavrix’s
photographs were posted at the direction of the users.”69
V. ANALYSIS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S LOGICAL REFORMULATION OF
THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS
Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc. holds that
moderators of online communities might be “agents” of the websites
that they monitor, potentially causing ISPs to lose the copyright safe
harbor if moderators allow infringing content to be posted publicly.70
This holding has caused alarm among ISPs and could signal a dramatic
shift toward a reshaping of the section 512(c) safe harbor in the Ninth
Circuit.71 According to the Mavrix court, if an ISP’s business model
relies on users uploading photographs and videos, and moderators are
65. Id. at 1031 (In the event that the moderators are found to be agents of LiveJournal, “the
fact finder must assess whether Mavrix’s photographs were indeed posted at the direction of the
users in light of the moderators’ role in screening and posting the photographs.”).
66. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir.
2013) (“Veoh does not actively participate in or supervise file uploading, ‘[n]or does it preview or
select the files before the upload is completed.’ Rather, this ‘automated process’ for making files
accessible ‘is initiated entirely at the volition of Veoh’s users.’ We therefore hold that Veoh has
satisfied the threshold requirement that the infringement be ‘by reason of the storage at the direction
of a user of material’ residing on Veoh’s system.”).
67. Id. at 1020.
68. Mavrix Photographs, LLC, 873 F.3d at 1056–57.
69. Id. at 1057.
70. Id. at 1054.
71. Terry Parker, et al., The 9th Circ.’s Surprisingly, Alarming DMCA Decision, LAW360
(May 11, 2017, 11:03 AM), https://www.law360.com/appellate/articles/921199.
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used to screen and post content that they deem non-infringing, the
DMCA will likely not shield copyright infringement that occurs on
that website.72 In order to fully explore the opinion, this Comment
examines the question of agency among ISPs’ moderators and the
particular impact that the opinion may have on ISPs located within the
Ninth Circuit.
A. The Trial Court Should Find the Moderators to be Agents of
LiveJournal According to the Common Law of Agency
The ONTD moderators should be labeled as agents of
LiveJournal according to the common law of agency. The Ninth
Circuit properly applied the common law of agency in Mavrix because
prior judicial decisions had already applied these agency principles in
the copyright context to determine whether a service provider could
be liable under the DMCA for the actions of internet moderators.73
Therefore, the court should conclude that the moderators were agents
of LiveJournal because they retained actual and apparent authority.
Agency is the fiduciary relationship that derives from the concept
that one person, the principal, utilizes another, the agent, to act on his
or her behalf.74 In order to establish an agency relationship, the agent
must have authority to act on behalf of the principal, and the principal
must have the right and ability to control the agent’s actions.75
Determining the principal’s level of control over the agent is the
most critical factor in deciding the agency issue.76 The Ninth Circuit
found that ISPs exercise sufficient control over moderators by not only
having the power to hire or terminate them, but also by issuing detailed
instructions to moderators concerning the appearance and layout of the
website, as well as the content that may be posted on the website.77
LiveJournal established its intention to control ONTD and its
moderators when it decided to “take-over” ONTD. ONTD was
originally operated by unpaid moderators, but once ONTD became
72. Id.
73. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1038 (9th Cir. 2017); see also
Soc’y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 56 (1st Cir. 2012)
(“Established law confirms agency principles may apply in the copyright context. . . .”).
74. Id.
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 2006).
76. Jones v. Royal Admin. Servs., Inc., 866 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing United
States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 505 (9th Cir. 2010); accord NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d
1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2008).
77. Perfect 10, Inc., v. Cybernet Ventures, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1159–60 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

(7)51.4_OSWALD (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

MAVRIX AND SAFE HARBOR PROTECTION

9/13/2019 4:19 PM

725

LiveJournal’s most popular thematic community, the company
assumed command of ONTD to expand the website and to acquire
more advertising revenue.78 In order to obtain absolute control of the
community, LiveJournal hired Brian Delzer as a full-time employee
to act as the primary leader designated to supervise and control the
activities of the moderators.79
The direct supervision of the moderators by Delzer created a
supervisor-supervisee relationship. This type of relationship can be
distinguished from the type of relationship in Jones v. Royal
Administration Services, Inc.80 In Jones, the court upheld the
independent contractor status of telemarketers working for Royal
because Royal did not directly supervise the telemarketer’s calls, nor
did it control the telemarketers’ work hours.81 Here, Delzer oversaw
the moderators’ work and expressly instructed the moderators
regarding content to add to the website or to delete from the website.82
Delzer also established control for the ISP as an administrative
“owner” who added and removed moderators on the basis of their
work performance.83 While ONTD moderators were free to “go and
volunteer their time in any way they [saw] fit,” it can be argued that
Delzer controlled the moderators’ work schedules by adding a
European moderator to oversee the website’s content while the U.S.
moderators were off duty or sleeping.84 Thus, LiveJournal utilized
Delzer to exert sufficient control over the moderators’ work.
There are two main types of agency: actual and apparent.85
Actual authority is separated into the two general categories of actual
express authority and actual implied authority.86 Actual express
authority refers to when a principal enters into an express agreement
with an agent authorizing him to engage in a particular act.87 Actual
implied authority refers to when a principal enters into an express
agreement with an agent, but the principal does not specifically

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., 873 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id.
866 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1106.
Mavrix Photographs, LLC, 873 F.3d at 1050.
Id. at 1049–50.
Id. at 1050, 1055.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006).
Id. §§ 2.01, 3.01.
Id. § 2.01.
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authorize the agent to act in the action at issue.88 However, the agent
reasonably believes that the “authority for that action has been
delegated to him” through the scope of his position.89
Apparent authority is created when a principal has no agreement
with an agent authorizing the action, but a third-party reasonably
believes that the agent has the authority to act with legal consequences
for the principal.90
The district court erred in refusing to apply the common law of
agency in the Mavrix case. Here, LiveJournal was a principal and the
moderators were agents who undertook the particular action of
monitoring the ONTD community on LiveJournal’s behalf.
The trial court should ultimately conclude that the ONTD
moderators had actual authority because LiveJournal manifested its
assent for the moderators to act on its behalf to approve or deny posts,
while supplying the moderators with detailed instructions for
approving or rejecting posts.91
First, there was a relationship of actual, implied authority because
LiveJournal allowed the moderators to act on the company’s behalf by
giving the moderators varying levels of authority to screen usersubmitted content.92 If a principal states the general nature of the
action an agent is to perform, then an agent has implied authority.93
LiveJournal ran the website’s moderator sector like a business by
creating a system comprised of three different levels of “administrator
roles” among the moderators.94 At the lowest administrator level,
“moderators” screened user-submitted posts for child pornography
and assured that each one contained celebrity news.95 “Maintainers”
were a step above moderators because they could delete posts and
88. Id.
89. Eric Rasmusen, Agency Law and Contract Formation, HARV. L. SCH. JOHN M. OLIN
CENTER FOR L., ECONS., AND BUS. DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, May 8, 2001, at 5.
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006).
91. Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., 873 F.3d 1045, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017).
92. Id. at 1054–55.
93. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp. v. Friendly Broad. Co., 414 F.2d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 1969).
94. Mavrix Photographs, LLC, 873 F.3d at 1024, 1054–55 (“Unlike other sites where users
may independently post content, LiveJournal relies on moderators as an integral part of its
screening and posting business model. LiveJournal also provides three different levels of authority:
moderators review posts to ensure they contain celebrity gossip and not pornography or
harassment, maintainers delete posts and can remove moderators, and owners can remove
maintainers. Genuine issues of material fact therefore exist regarding whether the moderators had
actual authority.”).
95. Id. at 1054.
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remove moderators and users from ONTD.96 At the highest
administrator level was the single “owner” of a community.97 The
“owner” held the highest level of authority within the moderators
because he had the power of a maintainer and could also remove
maintainers from their positions.98 The court accurately declared that
ONTD’s moderators “performed a vital function in the LiveJournal[]
business model.”99 The duties performed by the moderators were
solely for the benefit of LiveJournal. The moderators act like puppets,
as they are told how to perform and are removed from their positions
if they do not successfully perform or follow the rules.
Second, the moderators were given express instructions
concerning the criteria for accepting or denying users’ posts. The
LiveJournal moderators had to follow the ONTD rules that
LiveJournal ratified.100 The ONTD rules stated that the content needed
to be recent and provided a list of sources from which material could
not be posted.101 These comprehensive rules constrained what the
moderators could publicly post.
It was clear that the moderators were actively following
LiveJournal’s detailed instructions because the moderators approved
and posted only one-third of all user-submitted content.102 Beyond
merely screening ONTD for child pornography, LiveJournal required
moderators to actively review posts to curate content for the website
devoted to breaking celebrity news.103 Therefore, the varying levels of
authority among the moderators coupled with the explicit instructions
96. Id. at 1049 (“‘Maintainers’ review and delete posts while also holding the authority to
remove moderators and users from the community.”).
97. Id. (“Each community also has one ‘owner’ who has the authority of a maintainer but can
also remove maintainers.”).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1054.
100. Id. at 1055 n.11.
101. Id. at 1050. (“ONTD’s rules pertain to both potential copyright infringement and
substantive guidance for users. . . . One rule instructs users to ‘[i]nclude the article and picture(s)
in your post. . . .’ Another rule provides ‘Keep it recent. We don’t need a post in 2010 about Britney
Spears shaving her head.’ ONTD’s rules also include a list of sources from which users should not
copy material.”).
102. Id. While the fact that ONTD moderators only approved one-third of all user-submitted
content could be indicative of the moderators’ level of inspecting the submitted content, that
statistic actually depends on the number of posts that were submitted each month. The real question
posed here is qualitative, not quantitative. This quantitative number is not significant when the
moderators are actually undertaking a qualitative analysis of the content; this focuses on the type
of content submitted and not the number of posts submitted.
103. Id.
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regarding the screening of content exhibits that the moderators had the
actual authority to act on behalf of LiveJournal.
The trial court should also find that an apparent authority
relationship existed between LiveJournal and the moderators because
the third-party ONTD users reasonably believed that the moderators
acted on behalf of LiveJournal.104 When a user’s post was removed
from ONTD following a DMCA takedown notice, for example, the
user asked LiveJournal why the moderators removed the post. 105 The
user argued that he or she faithfully followed ONTD’s strict
formatting guidelines, and the moderators had screened and approved
the post.106
The ONTD user relied on the moderators to decide whether the
post complied with the stringent thematic and copyright rules that
LiveJournal had ratified.107 The user showed that he or she reasonably
believed that LiveJournal provided the moderators with the authority
to act on its behalf in choosing which user-uploaded content to post by
complaining to LiveJournal once the post was taken down from the
website. Accordingly, the defined role that LiveJournal granted to its
moderators created an apparent authority relationship.
B. The Content Was Not Posted “At the Direction of the User”
According to the Section 512(c)(1) Threshold
The functions performed by ONTD’s moderators after a user
uploaded content to the LiveJournal server do not fall under the
meaning of “storage at the direction of the user” because the web
postings were posted on ONTD by the moderators, who should be
considered agents of LiveJournal.
The Ninth Circuit created a circuit split by rejecting the Tenth
Circuit’s definition of the word “user” as applicable to
section 512(c)(1).108 The Tenth Circuit stated that “user” should be
104. Id. at 1055; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006).
105. Mavrix Photographs, LLC, 873 F.3d at 1055 (“One user whose post was removed pursuant
to a DMCA notice complained to LiveJournal ‘I’m sure my entry does not violate any sort of
copyright law. . . . I followed [ONTD’s] formatting standards and the moderators checked and
approved my post.’”).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1055 (“The user relied on the moderators’ approval as a manifestation that the post
complied with copyright law, and the user appeared to believe the moderators acted on behalf of
LiveJournal. Such reliance is likely traceable to LiveJournal’s policy of providing explicit roles and
authority to the moderators.”).
108. Parker, supra note 71.
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understood according to “its plain meaning as ‘one who uses.’”109
More specifically, the Tenth Circuit said, “a ‘user’ describes a person
or entity who avails itself of the service provider’s system or network
to store material.”110 Under this analysis, an ISP’s employees could be
considered “users,” and thus, be granted near blanket immunity for
copyright infringement under section 512(c).111
However, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Tenth Circuit’s broad
meaning of “user” to assert that employees are not “users” under
section 512(c).112 While Congress never defined the term “user,”
common law of agency precedent affirms that an ISP is liable for the
“acts of its agents, including its employees” under the DMCA.113
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung114 furthered this idea when
the Ninth Circuit explained that torrents stored on the ISP’s website
that are uploaded by users of the website are eligible for the safe
harbor, while torrents collected for storage by the ISP’s employees and
uploaded would not be “facially eligible for the safe harbor.”115 Thus,
a “user” in the Ninth Circuit DMCA analysis should be interpreted as
an entity who interacts with an ISP’s website, but is not an agent nor
an employee of the website.
There is no question that ONTD users are initially adding
infringing material to an “internal queue” in the LiveJournal server
before the moderator reviews the content.116 However, the important
question is whether the ONTD moderators actively participated in
posting the content online, not who submitted the photographs to the
ISP, which was the district court’s focus on summary judgment117 The
court in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC held
that “posts are at the direction of the user if the service provider played
no role in posting them on its website or if the service provider carried
out activities that were ‘narrowly directed’ towards enhancing the
109. BWP Media USA, Inc. v. Clarity Dig. Grp., LLC, 820 F.3d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 2017)
(citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1297 (10th ed. 2001).
110. Id. at 1179.
111. See id. at 1180.
112. Mavrix Photographs, LLC, 873 F.3d at 1054.
113. Id. at 1053 n. 8; see also Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1038 (9th
Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen dealing with corporate or entity defendants, moreover, the relevant intent must
be that of the entity itself, as defined by traditional agency law principles. . . .”).
114. 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2017).
115. Id. at 1043.
116. Mavrix Photographs, LLC, 873 F.3d at 1050.
117. Id. at 1049; BWP Media USA, Inc. v. Clarity Dig. Grp., LLC, 820 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th
Cir. 2017).
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accessibility of the posts.”118 The Mavrix decision subsequently
expanded Shelter Capital’s narrow decision. In order to be liable for
copyright infringement under section 512(c)(1), an ISP must take an
“active role” in uploading user-submitted content and perform more
than accessibility enhancing functions such as reviewing submissions,
automatic reformatting, or takedowns.119
While previous court decisions articulate that the safe harbor
extends to software functions that “facilitate users’ access to the user
generated content,” this statement does not apply to the facts in
Mavrix.120 Previous decisions dealt with automatic processes where
the posts were still ultimately “at the direction of the user.” The ONTD
posts, however, were not “at the direction of the user” because the
moderators manually reviewed and reformatted the user-generated
posts in an effort to bring the highest number of viewers to the website.
LiveJournal’s intensive review process went beyond the automatic
processes that the Ninth Circuit had previously ruled as protected
under the section 512(c) safe harbor. Subsequently the ISP should not
be afforded safe harbor protection.
LiveJournal was not “posting at the direction of the user” because
the ISP was curating content for its business model by actively
deciding which user submissions to post on ONTD. LiveJournal knew
the content of each post uploaded to ONTD, unlike other ISP websites
like YouTube. YouTube allows users to upload videos to their website
from an electronic device by simply selecting a file and pressing a
“virtual ‘upload’ button.”121 YouTube is initially unaware of the
content uploaded because users can upload video content to the
website without the approval of moderators.122 Unlike YouTube,
LiveJournal was aware of the content posted on ONTD because users
did not simply press an “upload” button to post content; rather, each
user-generated post was screened by ONTD moderators before being
posted to the website.123 According to BWP Media USA, Inc. v. Clarity

118.
2013).
119.
1018) ).
120.
121.
122.
123.

UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1015–16 (9th Cir.
Mavrix Photographs, LLC, 873 F.3d at 1053 (citing UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at
UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1015–16.
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2nd Cir. 2012).
Id. at 35.
Mavrix Photographs, LLC, 873 F.3d at 1049.
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Digital Group, LLC,124 an ISP will normally benefit from the safe
harbor protection “if the infringing content has gone through a
screening or [an] automated process.”125
Additionally, ONTD moderators did not simply scan or “cursorily
review” the user-uploaded material.126 The moderators meticulously
and manually sorted through the voluminous amount of content users
uploaded to the ONTD server and only posted popular, attractive
celebrity content that would be sure to draw visitors to the website.127
The ONTD community rules clearly instructed users to deliver recent,
legitimate content and to include the original source of the “articles
and pictures in the post.”128 LiveJournal obliterates the possibility of
being considered a passive service provider by urging users to deliver
content that was created by others. By encouraging users to send
unoriginal material for the moderators to review, LiveJournal acts as
a participant in the infringement of the copyrighted material.129
Therefore, once the court decides that the ONTD posts were not
uploaded “at the direction of the user,” LiveJournal should be
completely denied safe harbor protection under section 512(c).
C. Possible Ramifications for Online Service Providers in the Ninth
Circuit after the Mavrix Decision
LiveJournal complains that the court’s ruling will dramatically
“reshape” the DMCA and will “cast an enormous cloud on service
providers.”130 However, even if the court ultimately finds that
ONTD’s moderators are agents of LiveJournal, there will not be
disastrous implications for ISPs in the Ninth Circuit because ISPs’
community-based business models cannot survive without the work of
moderators.

124. 820 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2017).
125. Id. at 1181 (citing UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006,
1020 (9th Cir. 2013)); see, e.g., CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, 373 F.3d 544, 558 (4th Cir. 2004).
126. Parker, supra note 71 (citing CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, 373 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir.
2004)).
127. Mavrix Photographs, LLC, 873 F.3d at 1050.
128. Id. (“[O]ne rule instructs users to ‘[i]nclude the article and pictures(s) in your post, do not
simply refer us off to another site for the goods.’ . . . ‘Keep it recent. We don’t need a post in 2010
about Britney Spears shaving her head.’”).
129. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 2017).
130. Melissa Daniels, ‘Moderators’ Ruling Could ‘Reshape’ DMCA, 9th Circ. Warned,
LAW360 (May 8, 2017, 7:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/921458.
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In response to the Mavrix ruling, technological industry giants
Etsy, Pinterest, and Tumblr filed an amicus curiae brief warning that
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling will discourage ISPs from reviewing usergenerated content if the moderation efforts would cause a loss of the
safe harbor protection.131 The ISP giants argue that they would be
unfairly denied safe harbor immunity because they exceed the
statutory requirements for preventing copyright infringement on their
websites by employing moderators.132 These ISPs believe the
possibility of being held liable for employing moderators threatens not
only the users who create and consume the posted content, but also
harms the copyright owners’ interests by discouraging efforts for the
ISPs to identify and block infringing material that users submit. 133
Although monitoring of user-submitted material is not required
under 17 U.S.C. § 512(m), nearly all major commercial websites with
user-generated content are “policed by human moderators.”134 Prescreening, whether automated or human, has vast benefits. 135 It halts
illegal content, such as child pornography, from being accessible to
the masses, and retains material consistent with the website’s
standards enumerated in its terms of service.136
In addition, it seems unlikely that ISPs will shut down simply due
to increased responsibility and potential liability.137 As stated in
131. Brief for Online Service Providers Etsy, Kickstarter, Pinterest, and Tumblr in Support of
Appellee at 23, Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., 873 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017) (No.
14-56596), 2015 WL 3970267 at *22.
132. Id. at *11.
133. Id. at *17.
134. Adrian Chen, When the Internet’s ‘Moderators’ Are Anything But, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jul.
21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/magazine/when-the-internets-moderators-areanything-but.html.
135. At the moment, however, human moderation is more vital to ISPs for screening and
filtering content than artificial intelligence because it is more accurate. See Olivia Solon, Facebook
is Hiring Moderators. But is the Job Too Gruesome to Handle?, GUARDIAN (May 4, 2017, 5:00
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/04/facebook-content-moderators-ptsdpsychological-dangers (“You can have a situation where the words that are being typed by the end
user are exactly the same but one is a casual joke and the other is a serious thing that needs
escalation. . . . This requires intuition and human judgment. Algorithms can’t do that.”); see also
Emma Woollacott, YouTube Hires More Moderators as Content Creators Complain They’re Being
Unfairly Targeted, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2017,
5:42
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2017/12/05/youtube-hires-more-moderators-ascontent-creators-complain-theyre-being-unfairly-targeted/#4a8ee22c6a49 (“Human reviewers
remain essential to both removing content and training machine learning systems because human
judgment is critical to making contextualized decisions on content. . . .”).
136. Brief for Online Service Providers Etsy, Kickstarter, Pinterest, and Tumblr in Support of
Appellee, supra note 131, at 24.
137. Harris, supra note 10, at 854.
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Mavrix, moderators play a vital role in ISPs’ business models as
“forces of stability and civility in the raucous digital realm.”138 This
dominant business model has ISPs attempting to direct high traffic to
their websites while employing as few people as possible.139 As the
website expands, however, there is a crucial need for more moderators
to retain control over ISPs’ communities.140
With the amount of content posted online daily, some of it
inappropriate, the modern internet could not exist without
moderators.141 Content moderation permits ISPs to publish ample
amounts of user-generated content while simultaneously “preserving
the reputation of the ISP and protecting the user.”142 Moderators
ensure that the posted material does not diverge from an ISP’s theme
or its terms, while also minimizing the risk that website visitors will
encounter upsetting material.143 ISPs’ use of moderators can actually
result in improved search engine rankings, which may eventually lead
to an increase in user traffic to the website.144
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mavrix will not ultimately cause
ISPs like Facebook and Reddit to cease monitoring user-generated
content all together. While ISPs argue that they will lose the safe
harbor protection if they use a monitoring system, the fact is ISPs
cannot survive without moderators. In conclusion, user-generated
content comes with many risks. However, moderators play the key
role in controlling the unpredictable content and ensuring the positive
depiction of an ISP’s brand.
138. Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., 873 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2017); Chen,
supra note 134; see Alexis C. Madrigal, ‘The Basic Grossness of Humans’, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/12/the-basic-grossness-ofhumans/548330/ (“They must keep the content flowing because that is the business model: Content
captures attention and generates data. They sell that attention, enriched by that data.”).
139. Chen, supra note 134.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Jason Falls, Why Content Moderation is Critical to Your Business, ONE SPACE BLOG
(Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.onespace.com/blog/2017/03/why-content-moderation-is-critical-toyour-business/; see, e.g., Sarah Frier, Facebook Hiring 3,000 People to Monitor Live Video for
Violence, BLOOMBERG (May 3, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201705-03/facebook-hiring-3-000-people-to-monitor-live-video-for-violence; see also Sam Levin,
Google
to
Hire
Thousands
of
Moderators
After
Outcry
over
YouTube Abuse Videos, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2017,
2:34
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/04/google-youtube-hire-moderators-childabuse-videos (YouTube announced in 2017 that it “would expand its total workforce to more than
10,000 people responsible for reviewing content that could violate its policies.”).
143. Falls, supra note 142.
144. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
When the DMCA was established in 1998, ISPs and the safe
harbor provisions did not exist. The goal of the section 512 safe harbor
statute was to facilitate the expansion of the Internet while also
protecting copyright owners. Flash forward to 2017, where ISPs play
a major role in modern society with little or no legal consequences for
utilizing copyrighted works on their websites. By narrowing the
section 512(c) safe harbor, the Ninth Circuit in Mavrix has clearly sent
a message to ISPs that total immunity will not be granted for copyright
infringement. ISPs are no longer allowed to permanently dock
themselves in the “safe harbor.” Going forward, if ISPs or their agents
post infringing material on their websites, there will be legal
consequences in the Ninth Circuit.

